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Nontechnical Summary 
Why do establishments pay wages that increase with seniority? There are three 
rivalling theories that can explain this empirical phenomenon – the agency theory, 
human capital investments and efficiency wage theory. The agency theory stresses 
that establishments aim at motivating and retaining their employees by paying them a 
low initial wage and higher wage increases with tenure than their productivity 
increases. The human capital theory asserts that earnings increase with tenure 
because productivity increases by training efforts. The efficiency wage theory finally 
argues that establishments want to motivate their employees by paying them a higher 
wage than the market wage from the start. These theories lead to different predictions 
on the characteristics of establishments that offer seniority wages. This paper tries to 
disentangle the theories by explaining the differences in the steepness of seniority 
wages between establishments. It shows that establishments with higher than average 
seniority wages are characterised by a higher qualified work force, works councils 
and collective bargaining coverage, lower initial wages for entrants, a higher 
profitability, flexible working time arrangements for senior employees and a large 
size but no stronger training investments. These findings are in accordance with 
agency theories and do not support the other theories. The paper introduces an 
innovative two-step estimation procedure on the basis of representative German 
linked employer-employee panel data. This makes it possible to first calculate 
individual seniority wages taking into account that the tenure effect on wage is 
biased by matching quality. Second, individual seniority wages are aggregated to the 
establishment level. Finally the seniority wage indicator is explained by a broad 
spectrum of establishment characteristics.  
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Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Weshalb bezahlen Arbeitgeber Löhne, die mit der Betriebszugehörigkeit steigen? 
Drei Theorien können dieses empirische Phänomen erklären – die Prinzipal-Agenten 
Theorie, die Humankapital- sowie die Effizienzlohntheorie. Die Prinzipal-Agenten 
Theorie betont, dass Arbeitgeber ihre Beschäftigten an sich binden und motivieren 
wollen indem sie ihnen einen relativ niedrigen Einstiegslohn sowie im Laufe der 
Betriebszugehörigkeit stärker steigende Löhne bezahlen als dies deren steigende 
Produktivität rechtfertigen würde. Die Humankapitaltheorie hingegen zeigt, dass die 
Löhne parallel zur Produktivität der Beschäftigten aufgrund von 
Weiterbildungsanstrengungen steigen. Die Effizienzlohntheorie schließlich 
argumentiert, dass Arbeitgeber die Beschäftigten dadurch motivieren, indem sie von 
Anfang an einen Lohnaufschlag gegenüber dem Marktlohn zahlen. Diese Theorien 
führen somit zu unterschiedlichen Vorhersagen, welche Betriebe ihren Beschäftigten 
hohe Senioritätslöhne anbieten sollten. Dieser Beitrag versucht die empirische 
Relevanz der drei Theorien zu testen, indem er die Unterschiede zwischen 
Unternehmen innerhalb eines Sektors bezüglich der Höhe der Senioritätslöhne durch 
betriebliche Charakteristiken erklärt. Er zeigt, dass Arbeitgeber mit 
überdurchschnittlich hohen Senioritätslöhnen höher qualifizierte Beschäftigte, einen 
Betriebsrat, eine höheren Gewinn, niedrige Einstiegslöhne und Alterszeit haben 
sowie an Tarifverhandlungen teilnehmen und größer sind. Ihre 
Weiterbildungsanstrengungen sind jedoch nur durchschnittlich. Diese Befunde 
stützen die Prinzipal-Agenten Theorie und sind nicht mit den beiden anderen 
Theorien kompatibel. In diesem Beitrag wird ein repräsentativer verknüpfter 
Beschäftigte- Betriebspaneldatensatz sowie ein innovatives zweistufiges 
Schätzverfahren verwandt. Dies ermöglicht es, zuerst individuelle Senioritätslöhne 
zu berechnen und hierbei zu berücksichtigen, dass der Einfluss der 
Betriebszugehörigkeit auf die Löhne durch die Güte der Passgenauigkeit zwischen 
dem Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer verzerrt sein kann. Im zweiten Schätzschritt 
werden die individuellen Senioritätslöhne auf das Betriebsniveau aggregiert. 
Schließlich wird die Abweichung der betrieblichen Senioritätsentlohnung vom 
Sektordurchschnitt durch eine Reihe von Betriebscharakteristiken erklärt.
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Abstract 
This paper characterises establishments that pay higher seniority wages than their 
competitors. It tests whether seniority wages are paid on the basis of agency, human 
capital or efficiency wage considerations. A representative linked employer-
employee panel and an innovative two-step estimation strategy are used to first 
calculate individual seniority wages taking into account that match quality biases 
tenure effects on wages. Then individual seniority wages are aggregated to the 
establishment level. Finally, the seniority wage indicator is explained by 
establishment characteristics. This contribution shows that large, profitable and 
establishments with a highly qualified workforce pay high seniority wages. Also 
collective bargaining coverage and works councils have a positive impact and the 
share of foreigners, training intensity and initial wage levels have a negative 
correlation with seniority wages. The results support an agency based motivation for 
seniority wages. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the major concerns of the empirical literature on seniority wages is to find out 
whether earnings increase stronger than productivity. This is notoriously difficult 
because the individual contribution to productivity is usually not measurable. A first 
branch of the empirical seniority wage literature therefore collects indirect evidence on 
the consequences of indicators for the steepness of seniority wages on establishment 
characteristics such as the employment or hiring structure and the average length of 
tenure (Hutchens, 1989; Bayo-Moriones et al., 2004; Daniel and Heywood, 2008). This 
vein of the literature usually is based on establishment level data and uses aggregate 
indicators for the strength of seniority wages and its consequences. A second string of 
influential contributions aims at disentangling the “pure” tenure effects in individual 
wage regressions from productivity increases caused for example by training (Altonji 
and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991). It (has to) assume that the correlation between wages 
and tenure is homogeneous across firms because these studies are based on individual 
data that do not include establishment characteristics. Notable exceptions are the 
contributions by Levine (1993), Margolis (1996), and Abowd et al. (1999) which are 
based on linked employer-employee data. These papers show that heterogeneity 
between establishments and cohorts in the returns to seniority is a significant empirical 
phenomenon. However they hardly characterise those establishments that pay seniority 
wages or concentrate on few correlations.1 It therefore seems promising to combine 
both branches of the literature by first calculating individual seniority wages and then 
explaining the differences in seniority wages between establishments on this basis by a 
broad range of indicators that can disentangle the motivation of establishments to pay 
high seniority wages.  
There are at least three rivalling theories that explain increasing wages with 
seniority - the agency theory, the human capital theory and the efficiency wage theory. 
These theories imply different motivations to offer seniority wages and characteristics 
of establishments that offer seniority wages. This paper aims at empirically 
disentangling the three theories. The agency theory argues that employees are retained 
and motivated by paying steeper earnings than productivity profiles for those who stay 
1 Levine (1993) interacts the steepness of the seniority profile with time required for training, initial 
wages and employee turnover. 
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in the establishment. Employees receive a low initial wage and contribute to a bond 
during the first years of seniority that is paid back later by wage increases exceeding the 
productivity increases (Lazear, 1979; Hutchens, 1987). This theory is contested by 
efficiency wage considerations that claim that some establishments pay higher wages 
than the market wage for all or selected employees during their entire career in order to 
motivate and retain them (Akerlof and Katz, 1986) – here besides seniority wages also 
initial wages are higher than that paid by the average establishment. Finally, the human 
capital theory stresses that earnings increases with seniority are a consequence of 
improvements in human capital induced by training (Carmichael, 1983; Hellerstein and 
Neumark, 1995; Neumark and Taubman, 1995; Mincer and Higuchi, 1998) – as a 
consequence earnings and productivity profiles have the same steepness and seniority 
wages are positively correlated with efforts to improve human capital.  
This paper offers several contributions to the empirical seniority wage literature. 
It systematically characterises enterprises that offer a steeper seniority wage profile than 
other establishments in the same sector. It includes a broader variety of explanatory 
variables than before based on theoretical hypotheses. This allows a better 
discrimination between the three main seniority wage theories. In addition to 
establishment size, initial wages, and training behaviour that have previously been 
analysed in the seniority wage literature, it for the first time includes indicators for 
industrial relations, working time flexibility for older employees, establishment 
profitability, and the workforce qualification structure. In addition, the steepness of 
establishment seniority wages is calculated on the basis of individual data according to 
the estimation approach proposed by Topel (1991). In a next step the individual 
seniority wages are aggregated to the establishment level. This two-step procedure 
avoids potential biases in the measurement of the seniority earnings profile.  
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. The next part discusses 
in detail the main theories why enterprises pay seniority wages, which kinds of 
establishments should offer seniority wages according to these theories and the 
empirical evidence on differences between enterprises with respect to their seniority 
wage structure. The third part explains the empirical estimation strategy and the fourth 
part presents the representative linked employer employee panel data set used. The fifth 
part contains the empirical evidence on the characteristics of establishments that pay 
steeper seniority wages than the average and the sixth part concludes. 
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2 Background 
According to Lazear (1979, 1981), employers and employees may enter into implicit 
contracts, whereby workers receive a wage that is less than the value of their marginal 
product at the beginning of the contract and larger than the value of the marginal 
product at the end. The employees are indifferent to work for an employer with implicit 
contracts or an employer that pays wages equal to the marginal product value if the 
(expected) present value of both earnings paths is equal. The steeper wage path of firms 
with deferred compensation changes the workers´ incentive structure, however. It 
induces them to work harder and remain honest with the firm in order to finally reach 
the pay-back period of the bond. Workers who shirk or steal run the risk of being caught 
and fired and forgo the higher payments that come at the end of the contract. This 
change in behaviour efficiently solves the agency problem2 and makes redundant more 
costly alternatives such as efficiency wages (i.e. wage mark-ups paid during the entire 
career) or extensive effort control mechanisms. Deferred compensation or seniority 
wages therefore increase the value created over the life cycle and probably also the life 
time wealth for the employee if the employer shares part of the increased value. One 
condition is however that the employee trusts the employer not to renege on the implicit 
contract because the employer´s gain to terminating a work relationship midstream is 
large. 
The agency interpretation of seniority wages implies several correlations 
between the steepness of the tenure wage profile and establishment characteristics. 
First, Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979) predict a negative relation between 
the returns to seniority and wages of job entrants because employees first have to 
contribute to a bond that is repaid later. A negative correlation between the steepness of 
seniority wages and initial wages is an indicator that distinguishes the agency 
interpretation from a rivalling interpretation: in an efficiency wage model, Akerlof and 
Katz (1986) argue that younger workers with strong seniority wages should also receive 
higher wages at the beginning of their careers. Abowd et al. (1999) demonstrate 
however on the basis of a panel of French individual-firm matched observations 
collected by INSEE for 1976-1987 that returns to seniority are negatively related to 
initial pay. Levine (1993) also finds a negative correlation between plant-specific 
2 Agency problems arise when employees reduce the joint surplus because the labour contract leaves 
leeway (their behaviour is not transparent to the principal because there is asymmetric information, risk, 
and uncertainty) and the interests of employer and employee are not aligned (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). 
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returns to tenure and plant-specific average initial wages. He uses two small cross-
section linked employer-employee surveys from the Indianapolis area in the United 
States and the Atsugi region in Japan. Bronars and Famulari (1997) estimate wage 
growth differentials across employers. They relate initial wages to current wages taking 
into account current tenure and find a significant dispersion in wage growth differentials 
across employers, conditional on worker characteristics. Differences in employer and 
worker characteristics therefore can account for a large share of the differences in wage 
growth. The authors use the US Bureau of Labor Statistics´ White Collar Pay Survey 
entailing 1681 workers in 241 establishments. They differentiate between average wage 
growth of men and women with different tenure and experience, and they demonstrate 
that employees with high wage growth had lower initial wages.  
The other main rivalling explanation for increasing wages with tenure besides 
the efficiency wage theory is that they might be completely driven by (specific) human 
capital investments that lead to higher productivity (Carmichael, 1983; Hu, 2003). 
According to this theory greater training efforts imply a steeper seniority profile on the 
job and returns to experience according to the human capital theory (Mincer and 
Higuchi, 1988). The problem is that it is not easy to empirically disentangle tenure and 
training effects on wages because productivity increases associated with training 
investments are hard to measure and agency related deferred compensation might only 
apply for certain jobs or enterprises (Hutchens, 1989). The results presented by the 
empirical literature that tries to find out whether wage increases with seniority are 
caused by human capital increases or agency considerations are not consistent so far. 
On the basis of the waves 1976-1984 of the Michigan Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics, Brown (1989) shows for example that within-firm wage growth is correlated 
to years of training necessary to do the job. He finds no additional effects of tenure on 
wages and high returns to specific training. Brown concludes that seniority wages are 
no indicators of agency problems. Barth (1989) uses a very similar indicator for the 
required level of on-the-job training but finds that firms in which employees have jobs 
that require a relatively high level of on the job training pay a lower seniority premium. 
Levine (1993) first calculates enterprise-specific returns to tenure by interacting 
individual tenure (and tenure squared) with plant identifiers in an individual wage 
equation. In a second estimation step, he tests whether establishments with high average 
returns to tenure have higher training incidence in specific and/or general human capital 
according to the human capital theory. Levine finds a negative correlation between 
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seniority wages and four out of five training indicators. Both papers therefore support 
the agency interpretation of wage increases by tenure. Lazear and Moore (1984) 
compare the steepness of age-earnings profiles between self-employed and salary 
workers taking into account on-the-job training. On the basis of the US Current 
Population Survey for 1978 they come to the conclusion that under some strong 
assumptions most of the increase in wealth across occupations that is associated with 
steeper wage profiles reflects incentives and not on-the-job training. 
Another indicator that allows us to distinguish between the agency and the 
human capital interpretation of seniority wages is establishment size. One might assume 
that larger firms have a stronger agency problem than smaller firms because the 
employees are not so easy to control and the individual contribution to the 
establishment performance is not readily measurable (Booth and Frank, 1996). Using 
separate individual Mincer equations for three establishment size classes, Hashimoto 
and Raisian (1985) find that in Japan the largest firms indeed pay the highest rewards 
for seniority and the smallest firms the lowest. They use the Japanese Basic Survey of 
Wage Structure for 1980. For the United States by contrast, they stress that the highest 
seniority wage mark-ups are paid by the smallest firms. The evidence is based on the 
1979 Current Population Survey (CPS). Hu (2003) on the other hand shows on the basis 
of pooled Mincer regressions from four waves of the Benefits Supplement to the US 
CPS between 1979 and 1993 that wage-tenure profiles are steepest for the largest firms 
and flattest for the smallest firms. She explains these differences by a higher propensity 
of larger firms to invest in firm specific human capital, however. The empirical 
evidence on the relation between the steepness of seniority wages and firm size is 
therefore contradictory so far.  
This paper tests several additional hypotheses on the correlation between the 
qualification structure, industrial relations, and exports that might empirically support 
the agency interpretation of seniority wages. The first hypothesis is related to the 
qualification structure of enterprises: it pays more to motivate and retain employees if 
they are higher educated because they usually have more discretion in their activities 
and an increase in their effort usually has a bigger impact on establishment 
performance. In addition, tying employees to the employer might be more important for 
higher qualified employees. They frequently have higher rates of planned mobility 
between firms in the process of building an optimal career path (Sicherman, 1990). This 
means that establishments with higher qualified employees should use seniority wages 
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more frequently in order to solve their agency problem. According to the human capital 
hypothesis higher educated employees invest a higher proportion of their earnings 
capacity into the development of their human capital. This might also lead to stronger 
tenure-earnings profiles (Heckman et al., 1998). In order to separate both hypotheses 
therefore besides the education level also training has to be accounted for – the agency 
interpretation does not predict a positive correlation between training and seniority 
wages. 
The next hypotheses are related to industrial relations. Works councils try to 
protect employees with higher seniority by making it more costly to dismiss these 
employees. They hereby reduce dismissals and voluntary quits and increase the tenure 
of employees (Backes-Gellner et al., 1997). Works councils therefore make the 
commitment of an establishment more credible to keep their employees and pay higher 
wages in the future (Bayo-Moriones et al., 2004). They are also safeguards against 
employer opportunism because employers might be tempted to dismiss workers half 
way before they have received the full compensation for the bond they have paid in the 
first tenure years (Lazear, 1981). Especially with regard to dismissals, works councils 
have a rather strong position, implying that employment protection in Germany has a 
strong collective component (Backes-Gellner et al., 1997) -  prior consultation with the 
works council is a prerequisite of the validity of any dismissal (§§102-3, Works 
Constitution Act).  According to §1 of the Dismissal Protection Act of 1969, dismissals 
must not be “socially unwarranted”. This means that they must be justified in terms of 
either the conduct of the individual employee or the operational requirements of the 
enterprise. An additional argument for a positive impact of works councils on the 
tenure-earnings profile may be that works councils are dominated by insiders with high 
job tenure and that their effect is concentrated on their constituency (Boockmann and 
Hagen, 2003). Addison et al. (forthcoming) find however that the wage effects induced 
by works councils are higher for those groups with wage disadvantages (females, low 
qualified or foreigners). These groups usually are under-represented in the constituency 
of works councils, however.  
Unions might be especially attuned to the desires of senior workers – they are 
dominated by incumbents on the expense of labour market or job entrants (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984). Kuhn and Robert (1989) show in their two-worker union model that in 
order to extract the maximum rent from the firm, a union should support a wage profile 
that favours senior workers over junior workers independent of their distributional 
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preferences. Topel (1991) indeed finds that cumulative returns to tenure for union 
members are larger and rising relative to non-members. Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
note however that unions lead to a flatter wage profile, although the total compensation 
differential increases with seniority (a result, they find disturbing, p. 131). Booth and 
Frank (1996) argue on the basis of the British Household Panel Survey (wave 1991) that 
unions with a formal seniority wage scale have a steeper experience earnings profile 
than non-union establishments. This is not the case for unions without an incremental 
wage scale. In Germany, there are almost no formal seniority wage rules in collective 
bargaining contracts, however (Bispinck, 2006) and therefore higher seniority wages in 
establishments with collective bargaining and works councils might be an indicator to 
solve the agency problem by integrating the interests of unions and works councils. 
A further hypothesis in the same vein is that more profitable establishments 
might share profits by using seniority wages or rewarding their stayers by higher wage 
increases than other establishments. This correlation might also be expected in 
efficiency wage models. It therefore only allows the discrimination between agency 
considerations and human capital models. 
A final hypothesis that allows us to differentiate between the three theories is the 
option to offer part-time employment specifically for older employees (Altersteilzeit). 
Establishments that pay higher seniority wages as a consequence of an increase in 
productivity induced by human capital investments or efficiency wages should not have 
an incentive to allow older workers to work less hours if he or she wishes to do so. In 
the case of an agency induced seniority wage profile entailing higher wages than 
productivity, employers are quite willing to let employees work less when they are older 
because this saves part of the difference between productivity and wages. In addition, 
we know that older employees frequently prefer to work part-time when they get older 
because they have to take care for a sick relative or because their own health condition 
is then less affected by demanding work conditions (OECD, 2006, p. 77). 
Establishments that pay wages according to productivity such as in the human capital 
theory or according to efficiency wage considerations should be interested in getting the 
full working potential from their older employees. 
Summing up, the following correlations between establishment characteristics 
and the strength of the seniority earnings profile should be found if establishments pay 
seniority wages motivated by agency considerations: high seniority wages should be 
positively correlated with establishment size, profitability, the qualification level of 
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employees, and the presence of works councils, collective bargaining coverage as well 
as part-time working time arrangements specifically for senior employees. Finally, there 
should be no positive correlation between seniority wages and continuing training 
intensity and a negative correlation with initial wages.  
The empirical papers mentioned so far do not systematically explain the 
correlation between establishment characteristics and the steepness of the wage 
seniority pattern. Some contributions however try to find support for the agency version 
of seniority wages on the establishment or job level using aggregate indicators for 
seniority wages. Bayo-Moriones et al. (2004) use cross-section survey data from the 
Spanish manufacturing industry dating from 1997 and including more than 700 
establishments with more than 50 employees. The dependent dummy variable equals 
one if seniority is an important determinant for wage setting. They find some support 
for the agency theory because the self-assessed importance of seniority wages is 
negatively correlated with explicit monetary incentives and monitoring. Correlations 
with a strong union coverage, strong export share, wages above the sector level or 
establishment size are insignificant, however. 
Hutchens (1986 and 1987) also finds indirect support for the agency theory. 
Both papers do not look at establishments but at individual jobs. The first paper shows 
that jobs in which only a small share of recently hired workers are over age 55 in 
relation to the share of all workers that are over age 55 are characterised by mandatory 
retirement, a pension, long tenure, and high wages per hour for older employees. The 
second paper, which is also based on a cross section of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of older males and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles also shows that a 
repetition of tasks variable has positive correlations with mandatory retirement, pension, 
tenure, and wages of older employees and a negative correlation with the share of 
recently hired older workers. 
 Barth (1997) estimates individual Mincer equations including firm fixed effects 
and then analyses which average firm characteristics influence the fixed wage effect. On 
the basis of the cross sectional Norwegian Survey of Organizations and Employees (that 
on average reports wages for less than five employees per firm), he finds some support 
for the agency theory because piece rate workers have negligible returns to seniority 
while workers with less direct financial incentives enjoy returns to seniority. 
Hellerstein and Neumark (1995, 2004) and Hellerstein et al. (1999) pursue 
another estimation strategy – they measure the impact of different groups of workers on 
9 
 
productivity and wages in order to avoid the measurement problem of individual 
productivity impacts. Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) analyse the impact of young, 
middle aged and older employees in the occupation categories unskilled, academics, 
engineers, and technicians on productivity and labour costs. On the basis of Israel´s 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data from 1988, they do not find significant 
differences between the wage and productivity profile and tentatively argue that the 
wage increases are close to the productivity increases and therefore supportive of the 
human capital model. Their profiles are measured rather imprecisely, however. 
Hellerstein et al. (1999) compare in non-linear estimations the productivity impact of 
prime-aged workers with the impact of older workers with their differences in relative 
wages. They use a US linked employer-employee data set for 1989 from the Census of 
Population and the Longitudinal Research Database. They find that productivity and 
earnings rise at the same rate over the life cycle for both groups of workers. Hellerstein 
and Neumark (2004) use a similar estimation approach on the basis of the large and 
representative US 1990 Decennial Employer-Employee Dataset. They find that the 
estimated relative wage profile is steeper than the relative productivity profile, 
consistent with models of deferred wages. 
Most papers mentioned so far use indicators for seniority wages that do not 
disentangle the effect of tenure and matching quality. This might bias the seniority wage 
effects measured because employees with a better job match tend to stay longer with 
their employers (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991). The only exception is a 
paper by Abowd et al. (1999) that uses French linked employer-employee data (the 
Déclarations Annuelles des Salaires from 1976-1987). They show that the estimated 
returns to seniority decrease when a firm-specific intercept and a firm specific seniority 
wage slope are included in individual wage equations. In addition, the estimated 
standard deviation of the seniority wage slopes is at least three times as large as the 
mean of the coefficient (see also Margolis, 1996). This means that there is a lot of 
variance to explain between individual seniority-wage patterns. Abowd et al. (1999) do 
not attempt to characterise the differences between the enterprises, however. 
 
3 Estimation Strategy 
A string of papers shows that seniority wages can be split into wage increases induced 
by increases in matching quality and the seniority effect on wages (Altonji and 
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Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; Dustmann and Pereira, 2008; Orlowski and Riphahn, 
2008; Zwick, 2008). Employees with a better match between their skills and those 
demanded stay longer with their employer, have a higher productivity and earn more. 
However these employees frequently had high earnings already when they entered the 
job. This means that the seniority variable might be endogeneous in the wage equation. 
One way to avoid biases in estimations is to instrument seniority (and experience) by 
their deviations from the individual means (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Dustmann and 
Pereira, 2008). An alternative is to measure wage growth of stayers instead of wage 
levels and separate the tenure and experience effect on wages increases (Topel, 1991).  
The first estimation step in this paper is to estimate individual seniority wages 
according to the procedure proposed by Topel (1991). His original approach however 
constrains all firms to reward seniority in the same manner and precludes the possibility 
that firms might strategically use different levels of initial earnings and rates of earnings 
growth to motivate and retain individuals with particular combinations of productive 
capacities (Margolis, 1995). The measured tenure coefficient therefore is a weighted 
average of firm-specific returns and may deviate from the true average returns if we 
allow for differences between establishments. The first step is based on individual 
seniority profiles and therefore gives us the opportunity to discriminate between 
individuals with higher and lower observed seniority profiles by using the individual 
deviations from the predicted average increase in wages. In a second estimation step 
these deviations from the average seniority wages are therefore aggregated to the 
enterprise level and hereby identify establishments with steep and flat seniority wage 
profiles. Finally, the characteristics of the establishments that have a relatively steep 
seniority wage profile in comparison to the average establishment in the sector can be 
explained by various establishment characteristics. Here deviations from the sector and 
year means are used for all variables in order to control for the ease to monitor effort 
(Hutchens, 1989) and to capture macro-economic shocks that have an impact on all 
wages. 
 As indicated above, Topel (1991) argues that tenure is endogeneous in an 
earnings regression. In order to separate the tenure and the experience effect, first the 
growth of real wages ∆w in year t is estimated only for those workers i who stay with 
the same employer by the main characteristics that change over time – tenure ∆t and 
experience ∆e – (and their squares, triples, and quadruples)3: 
3 Results are roughly the same if we de-trend wages using year dummies in order to remove the 
   
2 3 4 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3it it it it it it it it itw t t t t e e eα α α α β β βΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + ε
 (1) 
From the estimates of equation (1), the cumulated predicted average wage increase 
since the present job began is calculated for every employee taking into account 
individual experience and tenure. Please notice that one cannot distinguish yet between 
the linear tenure and experience effect but only observe their combined effect in the 
coefficient α1 because both measures increase by one from year to year for those who 
stay in the same firm.  
The average predicted wage increase in the present job – given the current tenure and 
experience – is then deducted from the current wage in order to obtain the predicted 
wage at the beginning of the present job at  t=0 :  0 iiw w w= − Δ .4 In the next estimation 
step, w0 is explained by the experience at the beginning of the current job e0 and a 
vector F of further individual and enterprise characteristics: 
 0 0 0 ´i i iw e F iβ δ ζ= + +  (2) 
The unbiased wage increase induced by seniority is calculated by deducting the 
experience effect on the initial wage level β0 in equation (2) from the joint linear 
seniority and experience effect α1 in equation (1).5
Having obtained the unbiased individual seniority wage profiles, the steepness of the 
establishment seniority wages is calculated. For this, the error terms of equation (1) are 
taken (i.e. the positive or negative deviations from the average predicted wage increase 
 
itε ). This captures the individual deviation from the average wage increase for stayers 
taking individual experience and tenure into account. Then the individual residuals are 
aggregated to the average residuals on the establishment level $ i j
j
ε ∈∑ for every year. In 
a last step, the deviations of the yearly average enterprise residual from the sector and 
year average $ $it it jjt
i
d ε ε ∈= −∑ are calculated.6 It is therefore possible that if some 
                                                                                                                                                                          
effects of secular wage growth. 
4 We have to estimate the initial wage because it lies outside of our observation period for employees 
with long seniority. 
5 The second estimation step might bias the measured tenure effect downwards because job matches 
are heterogeneous and upwards because individuals are heterogeneous (Williams, 2004). In order to 
avoid these biases, Topel (1991) proposes to instrument initial experience with current experience in the 
second stage. In a robustness check, initial experience in equation (2) is instrumented accordingly. 
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6  Please note that this estimation procedure does not automatically lead to a negative relation between 
individual initial wages and the individual seniority wages (Neumark and Taubman, 1995). The initial 
employees in one enterprise earn more and some employees earn less than the average 
seniority wage in the sector and year, the aggregate deviation of the establishment is 
zero. As a robustness check besides the deviation from the sector and year mean, also a 
dummy is calculated. This dummy is one if the establishment pays higher seniority 
wage mark-ups than the sector average and zero otherwise.  
In order to characterise the establishments with high and low seniority wages, the 
aggregate deviation from the sector and year mean in year t, djt is taken as the 
endogeneous variable. It is explained by a vector G including the establishment 
characteristics identified in the previous section:  
 ´jt jt jtd Gφ ϕ= + . (3) 
All variables are taken as deviations from the sector and year average. 
One of the explanatory variables is initial wages of the employees. This variable is 
obtained by aggregating the predicted individual initial wages w0 from equation (2) to 
the establishment level and taking the deviations from sector and year averages.  
 
4 Data 
In order to characterise establishments that pay strong seniority wages in Germany, this 
paper uses the waves 1997-2004 of the linked employer-employee data set of the 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (LIAB). The so-called cross section 
version of this panel data set is chosen, which means that we have one observation per 
year (on June 30th) for virtually all employees in the establishments observed (see 
Jacobebbinghaus, 2008 for details). On the establishment level, the LIAB uses the 
representative survey data of the IAB establishment panel. This panel entails questions 
on value added, industrial relations, sector, average employee characteristics and 
expectations of the managers. The establishment data are linked by the means of a 
common identifier to the employee information. The individual level uses official data 
of the IAB employment register. Yearly information on wages, qualification, gender, 
tenure, experience, and age can therefore be linked to the employer data. Altogether the 
LIAB covers almost 7 Mio. employees and more than 8,500 establishments. 
The data provide daily earnings at the survey date. These wages are deflated by the 
official wage inflation data from the Federal Statistical Office. About 8% of the 
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wages are calculated by deducting the average predicted wage increase since the start of the topical job 
from the observed wage. The individual deviation from the average seniority wage εi is therefore not 
included in this estimation step. 
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observations have censored wages on the social contribution ceiling (only the ceiling 
value is reported in the data set and not the true earnings). Those censored wages are 
multiply imputed (compare Gartner, 2005) by defining 20 cells for different gender, 
qualification (five groups), and nationality. For each cell censored wage Tobit 
regressions are estimated separately including the covariates tenure, tenure square, age, 
sector (16 dummies), an East Germany dummy, and three dummies for the qualification 
level. Also tenure and experience are censored. For employees in West Germany 
experience and tenure are known since January 1st 1970 and for East Germany the 
variables are known since January 1st 1990. This means that between 16% (1997) and 
7% (2001) of the West German and between 46% (1997) and 28% (2001) of the East 
German employees have censored values. We account for censoring by also multiply 
imputing the censored values. The calculated imputed values for wages, experience and 
tenure might lead to excess variance in time differences and therefore only the first 
imputed value of several censored values in a row is taken. For the following values the 
same (inflation corrected) wage is taken instead of a separately calculated imputed wage 
and for tenure and seniority, one year is added to the base value. In order to check the 
robustness of the results, all regressions have also been executed without any 
observations with censored values for wages, tenure, and experience. The results were 
qualitatively the same and led to slightly higher estimated seniority wages (results 
available on request). 
Only employees who work full time are included because we do not know the 
working hours of those working part time. In the tradition of Topel (1991), only 
employees aged 18-60 are included in order to avoid strong selectivity at the age 
fringes. We exclude the East German employees because their experience and tenure 
information is heavily censored and wage increases are dominated by the quick catch-
up process between East and West German wages in the 1990s. We also exclude 
employees in public enterprises because they receive an automatic seniority bonus in 
the observation period and employers are not free to decide on the steepness of the 
seniority bonus. Apprentices are excluded because they have a strong wage increase 
after completing their apprenticeship. Finally, employees whose wages increased or 
decreased by more than 200% from year to year are excluded. 
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5 Why do employers pay high seniority wages? 
First the individual seniority wages are estimated analogously to the approach by Topel 
(1991). The average tenure/experience effect of an additional year at the same employer 
calculated according to equation (1) is about 11% in our sample (compare Table 1). 
This effect is comparable to that found by Counch (2003) for Germany on the basis of 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data for 1984-1992. It lies between the 
effect found by Lefranc (2003) and Counch (2003) for the USA (about 12% for 
1981/1984-1992) and France (about 5% for 1990-1997).7 The effect of initial 
experience on the predicted initial wage according to equation (2) found in a weighted 
OLS regression is about 6% (see Table 2). This means that initial experience β0 in 
equation (2) accounts for about half of the linear seniority and experience wage effect 
α1. This share of initial experience on seniority wages is comparable to that found by 
Lefranc (2003) for France but smaller than that for the USA. After deducting the initial 
experience effect from the combined seniority and experience effect, we obtain a 
seniority wage premium per annum of about 4%.  This effect is lower than that of 
comparable studies by Counch (2003) but higher than that by Orlowski and Riphahn 
(2008) also on the basis of the GSOEP for 2002-2006. The seniority wages presented 
here for Germany are higher than in comparable estimations for France and the USA – 
seniority wages are measured at around 1-2% (Lefranc, 2003), see the lower part of 
Table 2 for the estimated cumulative returns to job tenure.8  
 It therefore seems that wages increase with seniority within an enterprise in 
Germany and that this increase is comparable or even higher than that in the USA, UK 
or France. This corresponds with what the OECD (2005) concludes on the basis of cross 
section analyses without taking selectivity issues into account and what Counch (2003) 
finds in a comparison between Germany and the USA and Dustmann and Pereira (2008)  
in a comparison between Germany and the UK.  
 Not all establishments might use deferred payments and therefore we should 
allow for differences in the wage-seniority profile across establishments instead of 
looking at averages (Hutchens, 1986, Abowd et al., 1999). In the next step therefore the 
residuals from the individual wage increase equation for stayers (1) are aggregated to 
7 The results derived by Topel (1991) for the USA 1968-1983 are not comparable because he uses 
average hourly wages instead of the exact hourly wages at the estimation point in time. Lefranc (2003) 
also demonstrates that the estimation period plays a pervasive role in the calculations (repeating the 
estimation by Topel for the period 1981-1992 reduces the average coefficient from about 12% to 4%). 
8 If the initial experience variable is instrumented by current experience, this reduces the estimated 
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the establishment level and deviations from the sector and year means are constructed. 
This indicator has mean zero and variance 0.02. It is used as the dependent variable in a 
weighted ordinary least square equation with five qualification share indicators, training 
intensity, initial wage levels, an export dummy, the share of foreigners in the firm and 
dummies indicating whether there is a works council or whether the establishment is 
profitable plus year, size and sector dummies as explanatory variables. These variables 
are all included as deviations from the sector and year means (besides the year, size and 
sector dummies). As several observations of one establishment are used from different 
years, the estimation is performed using clustering by establishment (Moulton, 1990). 
First, several simple correlations are presented in order to get a rough picture of how 
the deviation from the sector mean in seniority wages is correlated with our main 
explanatory variables (compare Appendix Tables A2). The investment and consumption 
goods sector, the banking and insurance industry, and the rest category “other services” 
(for example personal services) pay higher seniority wages than the other sectors. 
Especially low seniority wages are paid in the sectors agriculture and forestry, 
hospitality, and education and training. According to our hypotheses, we find that large 
and more profitable enterprises, enterprises with highly qualified employees and 
enterprises controlled by works councils and collective bargaining contracts pay higher 
seniority wages. Contrary to the hypotheses derived from the agency interpretation of 
seniority wages, the simple cross correlations indicate that enterprises with higher 
seniority wages also train more and pay higher initial wages. 
Finally, the full model is estimated including all explanatory variables (compare 
Table 3). In a weighted OLS regression the deviation of the seniority wage in an 
enterprise from the sector and year average is explained. As a robustness check, a Probit 
regression is estimated. A dummy that equals one if the enterprise pays higher seniority 
wages than the sector average is used as the dependent variable. In both regressions 
clustering of establishments and heterogeneity in the variances are taken into account 
and all variables are estimated in deviations from the sector and year means.  
The multivariate regressions show analogously to the previous correlation results 
that larger enterprises and enterprises with higher qualified employees, works councils 
and collective bargaining agreements pay higher seniority wages. Enterprises with a 
high share of foreigners pay less seniority wages. The covariates “initial pay” and 
“training intensity” interestingly change their sign after including the other explanatory 
 
initial experience coefficient β0 from about 6% to about 4% in equation (2). 
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variables. Training is now negatively correlated with the steepness of seniority wages. 
This finding is according to the results by Levine (1993) and Barth (1997) for the US 
and Japan but in contrast to the results described by Hu (2003).9 Establishments with 
steep seniority wages pay lower initial wages. This is also found by Levine (1993) and 
Neumark and Taubman (1995). These results suggest that enterprises mainly pay 
seniority wages on the basis of agency considerations.  
Finally only the observations from year 2002 are used (compare Table 4). This 
reduction of the sample tests whether the results are robust if only single observations 
from every establishment are used. In addition, the dummy “part-time employment for 
older employees” can be included because it is only asked in the year 2002. This 
dummy variable has the value one if the establishment specifically offers part-time 
employment for employees who are older than 50 years of age. The results are very 
similar to those obtained from the sample covering several years. In addition, the part-
time employment variable for older employees is positively correlated with the strength 
of the seniority wages. This also supports the notion of seniority wages being mainly 
driven by agency considerations. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper explains why establishments pay higher seniority wages. It identifies 
establishment characteristics that allow discrimination between the three main theories 
for seniority wages – the agency theory, the human capital theory and the efficiency 
wage theory. According to Lazear´s (1979, 1981) agency theory (and contrary to the 
human capital theory), establishments with steeper seniority wages do not have higher 
training efforts. Also according to the agency theory and against the efficiency wage 
theory, establishments with higher than average seniority wages, offer lower initial 
wages for job entrants. Additional evidence for the agency interpretation of seniority 
wages is provided by a positive correlation between the qualification of employees and 
seniority wages: Higher qualified employees have more discretion in their activities and 
frequently build their career on voluntary job switches. This means that long-term 
financial incentives are particularly effective. Works councils are potent guarantors that 
the establishment does not renege on its promise to repay the bond financed by the 
9 Daniel and Heywood (2008) find that while indicators for deferred compensation are strongly 
negatively related to the share of older employees hired, training indicators have a much weaker 
correlation.  
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employees in their early career stages. This helps the establishment to credibly promise 
a life long wage profile that is steeper than the productivity profile. It is also found that 
establishments with collective bargaining pay steeper seniority wages - unions increase 
the tenure of employees and they are particularly interested in improving the situation 
of the core employees (those with long tenure). Larger establishments have more 
problems to monitor employees and provide explicit incentives because the individual 
performance is more difficult to measure – they therefore also rely more often on the 
implicit seniority wage incentive contracts. In addition, more profitable establishments 
frequently have stronger seniority wages because this is an efficient way to motivate 
and retain employees by sharing profits with their employees. Finally, establishments 
with higher seniority wages more frequently offer part-time employment for older 
employees, another fact that only can be explained by agency considerations.  
This paper therefore provides evidence that establishments with high seniority 
wages in Germany use a wage pattern that gives employees a wage level below their 
marginal productivity during the first years of their tenure and grants them a wage 
higher than their labour productivity after some time in the establishment. This 
interpretation is supported by the finding that establishments with higher seniority 
wages than the sector average hire less older employees and have a longer average 
tenure in Germany (Zwick, 2008). 
This paper includes a broader range of variables to characterise enterprises that 
offer steeper seniority wage profiles than the literature so far. It also uses an innovative 
two step procedure and a large and representative linked employer-employee panel data 
in order to properly calculate individual seniority wages before aggregating them to the 
enterprise level. Nevertheless this paper can only offer indirect indicators for steeper 
wage profiles than productivity profiles because direct measures for productivity are not 
available. 
. 
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Table 1: Yearly wage growth for employees staying in the establishment, 
dependent variable: ln(yearly real wage change), West-German males 
 OLS regression 
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Δ experience and seniority  0.115*** 0.001
Δ seniority2*100  -0.218 *** 0.003
Δ seniority3*1000  0.081*** 0.001
Δ seniority4*10000  -0.010 *** 0.000
Δ experience2*100  -0.621 *** 0.006
Δ experience3*1000  0.211*** 0.002
Δ experience4*10000  -0.027 *** 0.000
Number of observations  5305623 
R2  0.02 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Table 2: Explanation of job entry wages, dependent variable: estimated real wage 
at tenure = 0, West Germany 
 
Weighted OLS 
regression IV regression 
  Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Experience at job start 0.056*** 0.000 0.035 *** 0.000
Secondary education without professional 
degree  -0.040 *** 0.001 -0.042 *** 0.001
Secondary education with professional 
degree  -0.068 *** 0.001 -0.069 *** 0.001
Tertiary education with professional degree 0.295*** 0.000 0.240 *** 0.002
University of Applied Sciences  0.504*** 0.002 0.540 *** 0.002
University  0.656*** 0.001 0.666 *** 0.001
Foreigner  0.005*** 0.001 -0.009 *** 0.001
Dummy 1999  0.027*** 0.001 0.032 *** 0.001
Dummy 2000  0.029*** 0.001 0.040 *** 0.001
Dummy 2001  0.038*** 0.001 0.063 *** 0.001
Dummy 2002  0.064*** 0.001 0.097 *** 0.001
Dummy 2003 0.112 *** 0.001 0.146 *** 0.002
Constant  3.206*** 0.001 3.149 *** 3.203
Number of observations  4809951 4809951 
R
2
  0.34 0.30 
Estimated Cumulative Return to Job Tenure  (OLS regression) 
 5 years 10 years 15 years 
West Germany 1998-2003 0.23 0.40 0.56 
Topel (1991) for USA 1968-1983 0.18 0.25 0.28 
Lefranc (2003) for USA 1981-1992 0.06 0.11 0.15 
Lefranc (2003) for France 1990-1997 0.08 0.15 0.20 
Comment: Weights are the inverse of standard variance of job entry wages. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004. 
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Table 3: Determinants of establishments with higher seniority wages than the 
sector average, West Germany 1998-2004 
 
Weighted OLS 
regression 
Probit regression 
  Coef. Std. Dev.
Coef. Std. 
Dev.
Share secondary education without prof. 
qual. -0.003 * 0.002
-0.218*** 0.020
Share secondary education with prof. qual. 0.001  0.002 -0.037*** 0.014
Share tertiary education with prof. qual. 0.013 *** 0.005 0.199*** 0.039
Share polytechnics 0.030 *** 0.006 0.242*** 0.047
Share university 0.022 *** 0.004 0.369*** 0.035
Share foreigner -0.020 *** 0.003 -0.198*** 0.029
Works council  0.007 *** 0.001 0.062*** 0.009
Positive profit situation 0.009 *** 0.001 0.027*** 0.010
Collective Bargaining 0.005 *** 0.001 0.007 0.008
Continuing training -0.002  0.006 -0.012 0.009
Entry wages -0.003 * 0.001 -0.019 0.014
Establishment size 1-20 -0.005 *** 0.002 -0.049*** 0.010
Establishment size 21-100 -0.003 *** 0.000 -0.053*** 0.008
Establishment size 501-2000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.059*** 0.012
Establishment size >2000 0.006 *** 0.001 0.184*** 0.023
Number of Observations  27370 31901 
(Pseudo)R
2
  0.06  0.04  
Comments: dependent variables: deviation from average sector seniority wage (OLS) and 
dummy = 1 if above average sector seniority wage (Probit), regressions, clustered by 
establishment number and heterogeneity robust standard error, weights are the inverse of 
standard variance of seniority wage deviations in OLS, marginal effects in Probit, 
regressions include a constant, year dummies and 16 sector dummies. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Table 4: Determinants of establishments with higher seniority wages than the 
sector average, West Germany 2002 
 
Weighted OLS 
regression 
Probit regression 
  Coef. Std. Dev.
Coef. Std. 
Dev.
Part time for older employees 0.006 *** 0.001 0.095*** 0.017
Share secondary education without prof. 
qual. -0.006  0.004
-0.175*** 0.043
Share secondary education with prof. qual. -0.004  0.004 -0.009 0.030
Share tertiary education with prof. qual. -0.001  0.013 0.279*** 0.080
Share polytechnics 0.024 ** 0.009 0.270*** 0.100
Share university 0.020 * 0.010 0.324*** 0.071
Share foreigner -0.023 *** 0.007 -0.223*** 0.060
Positive profit situation 0.013 *** 0.002 0.056*** 0.021
Works council  0.006 *** 0.001 0.076*** 0.020
Collective Bargaining 0.004 *** 0.002 0.025 0.018
Continuing training 0.002  0.002 -0.269*** 0.018
Entry wages 0.001  0.003 0.015 0.029
Establishment size 1-20 -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.062*** 0.063
Establishment size 21-100 -0.001  0.001 -0.055*** 0.019
Establishment size 501-2000 0.002 * 0.001 0.046* 0.027
Establishment size >2000 0.008 *** 0.001 0.116** 0.055
Number of Observations  6049 6750 
(Pseudo)R
2
  0.07  0.07  
Comments: dependent variables: deviation from average sector seniority wage (OLS) and 
dummy = 1 if above average sector seniority wage (Probit), regressions, clustered by 
establishment number and heterogeneity robust standard error, weights are the inverse of 
standard variance of seniority wage deviations in OLS, marginal effects in Probit, 
regressions include a constant, year dummies and 16 sector dummies. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Wave 2002 
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used 
Variable  
Average 
Value Description 
Seniority  11.08 Years of seniority, imputed 
Experience 16.54 Years of experience, imputed 
Experience at job start 5.90 
Years of experience in current job at 
seniority equals zero 
Wage 4.56 log wage, imputed 
Secondary education without 
professional qualification 0.16 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
secondary education without professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Secondary education with 
professional qualification. 0.62 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
secondary education with professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Tertiary education without 
professional qualification (reference) 0.01 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
tertiary education without professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Tertiary education with professional 
qualification 0.05 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
tertiary education with professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Polytechnics 0.05 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
university of applied sciences, 
0=otherwise 
University 0.07 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
university, 0=otherwise 
Foreigner 0.10 Dummy, 1=foreigner, 0=German 
Works council  0.91 
Dummy, 1= works council present, 
0=otherwise 
Profit situation 0.28 
Dummy, 1=profit situation better than 
that at competitors, 0=otherwise 
Average employee age 40.31 Average age of employees  
Collective bargaining 0.91 Dummy,1=bargaining yes, 0=otherwise 
Training 0.90 Dummy, 1=training offered, 0=otherwise
Part-time for older workers (for 2002 
only) 0.83 
Dummy, 1=part-time offered, 
0=otherwise 
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Appendix Table 2a: Correlations between establishment size and seniority wages, 
West Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Establishment size 1-20 -0.013 *** 0.000
Establishment size 21-100 -0.007 *** 0.000
Establishment size 501-2000 0.006*** 0.000
Establishment size >2000 0.013*** 0.000
Number of Observations  6520865 
Adj. R
2
  0.08 
Comments: separate OLS regressions clustered by establishment number and 
heterogeneity robust standard errors. Regressions include a constant, year dummies, 
five firm size dummies, and 16 sector dummies. 
 
Appendix Table 2b: Correlations between establishment sector and seniority 
wages, West Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Agriculture and Forestry -0.013 *** 0.000
Mining and energy 0.001*** 0.000
Basic goods 0.000*** 0.000
Investment goods 0.002*** 0.000
Consumption goods 0.004*** 0.000
Construction 0.014*** 0.000
Trade -0.008 *** 0.000
Traffic and Communication -0.002*** 0.000
Banking and Credit  0.014*** 0.000
Insurance  -0.016 *** 0.000
Hotels, restaurants, private services -0.001*** 0.000
Education and publishing 0.003*** 0.000
Health services 0.013 *** 0.000
Business services -0.010 *** 0.000
Other services -0.001*** 0.000
Number of Observations  6520865 
R
2
  0.10 
Note:  reference sector is food processing. 
28 
 
Appendix Table 2c: Correlations between qualification and seniority wages, West 
Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Secondary education without prof. qual. -0.004 *** 0.000
Secondary education with prof. qual. -0.001 *** 0.000
Tertiary education with prof. qual. 0.008 *** 0.000
Polytechnics 0.008*** 0.000
University 0.008*** 
Number of Observations  6520865 
Adj. R
2
  0.02 
Note: reference is tertiary education without professional qualification 
 
Appendix Table 2d: Correlations between establishment characteristics and 
seniority wages, West Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Training dummy 0.002*** 0.000
Initial wage level 0.000 *** 0.000
Collective bargaining dummy 0.012*** 0.000
Good profit situation dummy 0.008*** 0.000
Export dummy 0.004*** 0.000
Works council 0.014*** 0.000
Note: all regressions have been performed separately; all regressions have 6520865 
observations and an adjusted R2 below 0.01. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
 
 
